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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
CORPORATIONS -

HOLDING

COMPANIES-CREDITORS-CORPORATE

ENTITY.

The stockholders of a lumber corporation, at the time financially pressed
but in a solvent condition, organized a new corporation to facilitate the
financing and sale of the product of the then existing corporation's mill.
The lumber corporation subscribed for 2494 and its officers for the remaining 6 of the shares of the corporation, called the Sales corporation.
Thereafter, the lumber company by bill of sale, transferred all its logs and
lumber to the Sales corporation in cancellation of the stock subscription
indebtedness, and the further consideration of $200,000 cash, this combined being a fair price for the material covered by the bill of sale. A
contract was also entered into whereby the lumber company was to manufacture these logs and others furnished to it by the sales corporation. The
officers and trustees of the two corporations were practically the same,
and the sales corporation maintained its offices at the same place with the
lumber company The sales corporation, however, kept its accounts separately and carried on all its business in its own name. Less than a year
later the lumber company passed into the hands of receivers, who then
carried on the business. Thereafter, actions were begun simultaneously
by two banks against the Sales corporation on its overdue promissory
notes. The receivers of the lumber company intervened in both actions
upon their claim that the Sales corporation was but a subsidiary of the
lumber company and that the banks could not, therefore, prefer themselves by these actions. The trial court found for the plaintiff banks,
which judgment was, on the appeal of the interveners, affirmed. First
National Bank of Seattle v. Walton, 46 Wash. 291, 262 Pac. 984 (1928).
The question of corporate entity has been a fertile field of debate in
the courts and among the legal writers for the past two decades with the
ever-increasing economic importance and use of such organizations. Some
have contended that a corporation is not a legal entity but merely a group
Hohfeld,
of individuals banded together with certain legal powers.
Nature of Stockholders Individual Liability for Corporate Debts (1909) 9
COL. L. REV. 285. Others claim that a corporation is so much a legal unit
as to be a person, Machen, Corporate Personality (1911) 24 HAEV. L. REV.
253, 347. The majority of writers have believed that there is an intermediate ground between these two views, that a corporation is a legal entity
but one which is subject to certain legal restrictions. Professor Wormser
says that the entity exists but points out that in five types of cases,
namely, "when the conception of corporate entity is employed to defraud
creditors, to evade an existing obligation, to circumvent a statute, to
achieve or perpetuate monopoly or to protect knavery or crime" the
courts cast aside the shield of the entity in order to carry out complete
justice. Wormser, The Veil of Corporate Entity (1912) 12 COL. L. REV.
496-518. Also, WORAISER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION (1928).
Professor Canfield believes that the entity is always inviolate but that in
Wormser's five classes of cases the court enlarges the words of the contract, the statute or the law to prohibit an individual from doing by means
of a corporation that which he could not personally do. Canfield, The
Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity Theory (1917) 17 COL. L. REv.
128. Whatever the theory is that the corporate existence will not be permitted to be used to perpetuate unconscionable wrongs in these types of
cases seems to be well supported by the authorities. 1 A. L. R. 610, note.
34 A. L. R. 597, note. 39 A. L. R. 1071, note.
Cases in Washington indicate that while a corporation exists as an
entity the facts may make it necessary for the court to disregard the
entity Spokane Merchants' Association v. Clere Clothzng Co., 84 Wash.
Mitchell v. Lea Lumber Co., 43 Wash. 195, 86
616, 147 Pac. 414 (1912)
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Pac. 405 (1906). Platt v. Bradner 131 Wash. 573, 230 Pac. 633 (1924).
On its facts, the instant case is interesting because it illustrates that,
where no fraud is shown to exist, one corporation may control another
even where the two corporations are each specially engaged in carrying
out certain phases of an aggregate business, if the corporations are bona
fide organizations at their inception and each maintains its own records
and carries on business in its own name. Where such facts exist the
entity of each will be adhered to as against the claims of the creditors of
the holding corporation even though it positively appears that the purpose of organizing the second corporation was to obtain credit which was
unobtainable by the holding company. This seems to be in accord with
accepted business principles and with the legal purposes and concepts of
corporate organization as evidenced by the holdings of cases from many
A. E. H.
jurisdictions.
HUSBAND AND WiFE-ComuNry PRoPERTY-TonRTs-LIABILny OF CommuNrX roR ACTS OF HUSBAN'D AS EXECUTOR. The plaintiff, as legatee, recovered a judgment against the defendant for "negligence and want of
care" in the management of the estate of which he was the executor and
trustee. Meck v. Behrens, 141 Wash. 676, 252 Pac. 91 (1927). The question presented here is whether the property of the community of defendant
and wife can be subjected to this judgment. Held: The community is
liable. Meck v. Cavanaugh,47 Wash. Dec. 136, 265 Pac. 178 (1928).
A tort which is committed by a husband while engaged in the prosecution of community affairs or which inures to the benefit of the community, creates a community liability. Oudin v. Cressman, 15 Wash. 519,
46 Pac. 1047 (1896) McGregor v. Johnson, 58 Wash. 78, 107 Pac. 1049, 27
Geissler v. Geissler, 96 Wash. 150, 164 Pac.
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1022 (1910)
746 (1917)
Hendrickson v. Smith, 111 Wash. 82, 189 Pac. 550 (1920)
DePhillips v.
Wicklund v. Allraum, 122 Wash. 546, 211 Pac. 760 (1922)
Neslin, 139 Wash. 51, 245 Pac. 749 (1926). However, the community property is not subject to the lien of a judgment against the husband for a
tort which was not committed for the benefit of the community or in the
course of community business. Wilson v. Stone, 90 Wash. 365, 156 Pac. 12
(1916) Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309, 166 Pac. 634 (1917). Nor is the
property of the community liable for a tort of the husband committed
while acting in the capacity of a public official. Brotton v. Langert, 1
Wash. 73, 23 Pac. 688 (1890) (Stiles, J., dissenting) (constable) Day
v. Henry, 81 Wash. 61, 142 Pac. 439 (1914) (sheriff) Bice v. Brown, 98
Wash. 416, 167 Pac. 1097 (1917) (drainage commissioners) Kies 'v. Wilk2nson, 114 Wash. 89, 194 Pac. 582, 12 A. L. R. 833 (1921) (county clerk)
Fidelity Deposit Co. of Md. v. Clark, 144 Wash. 520, 258 Pac. 35 (1927)
(sheriff) see annotation 12 A.L.R. 837.
The ground of the decisions in the public officer cases seems to be that
the husband, as official, is acting for the public who have created the
office, and that the fact that remuneration for the office becomes community property is incidental. It is submitted that this exception is unjust (1) to the husband, and (2) to the injured party. The separate property of the husband must bear the burden alone. It denies the injured
party compensation from the fund which has been increased by the official salary paid to the husband. McKAY, Co iuinrry P0orsnTy (2nd Ed.
1925) sec. 823. The dissent of Stiles J., in Brotton v. Langert, supra,
appears to be founded on meritorious grounds. The fund which takes
the husband's compensation should be liable for his official mistakes.
Consistently, perhaps, it should have been held that the salary of a public
official is his separate property.
The distinction made by the court between the "public officer" cases
and the present one is that the duties of an executor or trustee are not
primarily of a public, but essentially of a private nature, and therefore the
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community is liable. Without doubt, if the community may participate
in the business of being a notary public and be held for torts committed
by the husband as such, Kangley 'v. Rogers, 85 Wash. 250, 147 Pac. 898
(1915), the community may also be held for a tort of the husband as
executor of an estate, for it may be said that he is engaged in the prosecution of affairs inuring to the benefit of the community. It is submitted
that, on principle, the present case is correct, although, when viewed in
the light of the public officer cases the distinction, with respect to the
public nature of the office, is one of degree only, and with respect to the
community's enjoyment of the compensation, no distinction exists at all.
It may be doubted whether the test attempted to be laid down in Day V.
Henry, 81 Wash. 61, 142 Pac. 439 (1914), and applied in Kangley v. Rogers,
F P W
supra, can be logically applied.
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A

as

lessor leased to B, as lessee, a certain apartment house in the City of
Seattle, commencing March 1, 1923. On September 8, 1924, B purported
to assign and transfer to C the said lease and C assumed all obligations
under the lease. This assignment was consented to by A. The assignment
was absolute in form. C defaulted in the payment of rent and A thereupon sued B for accrued rent. B defended on the ground that A's consent
to the assignment of the lease relieved B of liability for the rent. Held:
That the assignment of B's title to C, although on its face absolute, was
conditional and that C therefore, under the doctrine of Ashford 'v. Reese,
132 Wash. 649, obtained no right, title or interest in the leasehold estate.
Ideal Investment Co. v. Neeley, 47 Wash. Dec. 518.
The applicability of the doctrine of A.hford v. Reese to the case in
question is not apparent. There is nothing in the face of the opinion to
indicate that the decision is in harmony with the case of Aylward v.
Lalley, 47 Wash. Dec. 41, decided two months earlier, in which the doctrine
of Ashford vs. Reese is "limited to those contracts which by their terms are
forfeitable." For discussion of the new forfeiture clause test in executory
contracts for the sale of real estate see 3 WASH. LAw RsvmNw 80. In the
instant case the assignment in question which is fully set forth in the
opinion, and which the court says is absolute in form, does not contain
anything that suggests a forfeiture provision. The instant case therefore
seems difficult to harmonize with the doctrine of Ashford v. Reese as recently construed.
A. J. S.

